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subcontractor and his materialman are joint payees, and no agreement exists with the 
owner or general contractor as to allocation of proceeds, the materialman by endorsing 
the check will be deemed to have received the money due him." Post Bros. Constr. Co. 
v. Yoder, 569 P.2d 133, 135 (Cal. 1977). It does not, however, impose an absolute bar on 
a materialman's recovery for any and all joint check proceeds that the materialman does 
not retain. As pointed out by the Oregon Court of Appeals, the "crucial question" 
regarding the joint check rule's applicability is "what is 'the money due him' which the 
materialman is deemed to have received." See Medford Sch. Dist. No. 549C ex rel. N. 
Coast Elec. Co. v. Peterson & Jones Commercial Constr., Inc., 708 P.2d 623, 625 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1985) (emphasis added). The "money due" the materialman "refers, not to all 
money which may ultimately be due, but only to the money due as of the date the check 
covers." See id.; see also Iowa Supply Co. v. Grooms & Co. Constr., 428 N.W.2d 662, 
666 (Iowa 1988) ("This rule only bars claims against the maker of the check for the 
money due from a subcontractor up to the date of the check and up to the amount of the 
check." (emphasis added)). It is for that reason that "the question of whether a joint 
check constitutes payment of the amount owed by the subcontractor to the lower-tier 
subcontractor is a question of fact based upon the intention of the parties." Slee AAA 
Cabinets & Millwork, Inc. v. Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co., 130 P.3d 887, 892 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2006). 
Here, although Atlas had received materials for the Matheson Junior High School 
Project (the "Project") whose invoiced value equaled or exceeded the full amount of the 
November 13, 2001, joint check, the $34,259.43 portion that QED allowed Atlas to retain 
was not yet due. The terms of Atlas's account with QED required Atlas to pay for the 
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product it received on or before the last day of the month following the month in which it 
received the product. (See PA-6,2 QED 0001-0059; PA-4, QED 0060-0061; R. 
2221:316-317, 446-47.) The trial court expressly found that "[u]nder the terms of 
QED's agreement with Atlas, as of November 19, 2001, Atlas was only past due for the 
invoices issued through September 30, 2001, which totaled $51,123.76 [the amount of the 
November 13, 2001, joint check retained by QED]." (R. 2134 f 53.) USF&G has not 
challenged this finding. Thus, although Atlas's account balance for the Project equaled 
or exceeded the full amount of the November 13, 2001, joint check, $34,259.43 of that 
check was simply not "money due" or past due. (R. 2220:211.) Simply put, on 
November 13, 2001, QED could not have recovered the $34,259.43 in a collection action 
against Atlas and was not legally entitled to demand that portion of the November 13, 
2001, joint check proceeds. The joint check rule is therefore inapplicable to this case, 
and no basis exists in fact or law for this Court to adopt it. 
3. If Adopted, the Joint Check Rule Should Not Be Given Retroactive 
Application. 
To the extent that the Court is inclined to consider arguments with regard to the 
joint check rule, and to the extent the Court is inclined to adopt the joint check rule as the 
law of Utah, that rule should not be applied retroactively to this case. Although judicial 
decisions generally have retroactive effect, retroactive application "is not invariable," 
Van Dyke v. Chappell 818 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Utah 1991), and "the extent of [a] 
decision's application is left to the discretion of the court." In re Loyal Order of Moose, 
2
 The trial court's exhibits were denoted by a designation of "PA" for "Plaintiff and 
"DA" for "Defendant" along with an exhibit number. For consistency purposes, the trial 
exhibits are referred to herein as they were at trial, i.e., "PA-1" for Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit 1. 
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#259 v. County Bd. Of Equalizations, 657 P.2d 257, 264 (Utah 1982). Indeed, 
retroactive application of a judicial decision "depends solely upon an appraisal of the 
relevant judicial policies to be advanced." See Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
862 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
A court may decline to allow a new decision to apply retroactively where "there has been 
justifiable reliance on the prior state of the law or [where] the retroactive operation of the 
new law may otherwise create an undue burden." Van Dyke, 818 P.2d at 1025. 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly declined to give retroactive effect to 
decisions with certain import. For instance, in Timpanogos Planning & Water 
Management Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that because certain water districts had "in good faith relied upon [the existing 
state of the law] in conducting their business for several decades," it "would work an 
injustice to cast a cloud upon the legality of their operations during those many years." 
690 P.2d 562, 572 (Utah 1984). Moreover, in Loyal Order of Moose, #259, the Supreme 
Court noted that "if the rule [in question] were to be given retroactive effect, the 
assessment of back taxes on properties affected by this rule might well result in an 
unreasonable burden upon all those organizations and governmental bodies associated 
with it." 657 P.2d at 265. In other words, the Utah Supreme Court has been decidedly 
reluctant to give its decisions retroactive effect where the parties would sustain undue 
burden and injustice. Indeed, one of the very purposes of the law is to provide a steady 
standard to which individuals and entities may conform so as to avoid liability and loss. 
See Black's Law Dictionary 884-85 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "law" as "[t]he regime that 
orders human activities and relations"). 
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Here, a retroactive imposition of the joint check rule would unduly burden QED 
and every other materials supplier that relies on the absence of the joint check rule's 
bright line rule of automatic forfeiture. Materialmen supply materials to subcontractors 
every day, and "[t]he use of joint checks in this type of situation is well established in the 
construction industry." Iowa Supply Co., 428 N.W.2d at 666. To impose the joint check 
rule in this case would result in an unjust, undue burden on QED and every other 
materials supplier who has relied status of the law in Utah regarding joint checks. 
Moreover, the joint check rule is in direct conflict with the general law of waiver 
in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "there is only one legal standard 
required to establish waiver under Utah law. . . . To constitute waiver, there must be an 
existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it.'" Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 
1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Phoenix, Inc. v. Heath, 61 P.2d 308, 311-12 (Utah 
1936)). In this case—and presumably in other cases as well—QED allowed Atlas to 
temporarily retain $34,259.43 of the November 13, 2001, joint check proceeds based only 
on its belief that no bright-line estoppel rule existed in Utah that would penalize it for 
doing so. If QED had known that its mere allowance of Atlas to retain the $34,259.43 
portion of that check would categorically forfeit its rights in that amount, QED could 
have made other arrangements with Atlas. But, relying on the absence of an automatic 
forfeiture rule, QED honored its agreement with Atlas and allowed Atlas to wait to pay 
the $34,259.43 amount until those invoices actually came due. Retroactive application of 
the joint check rule would therefore unfairly penalize QED. And, given the established 
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use of joint checks under these circumstances in Utah, QED is not the only materials 
supplier that would suffer from retroactive adoption of the joint check rule. 
B. The Trial Court's Application of Equitable Estoppel Principles Was an 
Abuse of Discretion. 
1. QED Has Properly Marshaled the Evidence in Support of the 
Findings of Fact It Challenges. 
Contrary to USF&G's argument, QED properly marshaled the evidence in support 
of the findings of fact it challenges. Despite the strictness of the marshaling requirement, 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require that an appellant challenging a finding of 
fact "first marshal [only] all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court's interpretations of Rule 
24(a)(9) emphasize that an appellant must marshal only evidence in support of the 
specific finding it challenges. See, e.g., State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, % 12 ("[P]arties 
challenging the facts under a clear error standard have a judicially imposed obligation to 
marshal the evidence in support of the challenged finding." (emphasis added)); United 
Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, If 26, 140 
P.3d 1200 (noting that an appellant "must demonstrate how the court found the facts from 
the evidence and then explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of the 
evidence" (emphasis added) (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,1f 78, 100 P.3d 
1177)). 
QED challenges only certain, narrow aspects of two findings of fact. Those 
findings of fact are as follows, set forth precisely as QED set them forth in its opening 
brief: 
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• In exchange for Atlas'[s] payment of $51,123.76 on or about November 19, 
2001, which satisfied all amounts owed to QED for the materials and 
supplies QED furnished for the Project through September 30, 2001, QED 
allowed Atlas to retain the balance of $34,259.43 provided by the 
November 13, 2001 joint check. (R. 2134 ^ 52 (emphasis added).) 
• Notwithstanding QED's belief that Atlas did not yet owe the remaining 
$34,259.43 of the November 13, 2001 joint check, and that QED, therefore, 
could not retain that money, in fact, the total of the [ujnpaid [i]nvoices 
[(PA-6, QED 0001-0059) (the "Unpaid Invoices")] on Atlas'[s] account for 
the Project (even after applying the $51,123.76 payment) equaled at least 
the remaining balance of the November 13, 2001 joint check—$34,259.43. 
(R. 2134 f 54 (emphasis added).) 
QED purposefully emphasized certain words in its recitation of the trial court's findings 
in order to define the narrow parameters of its two challenges to those findings. 
Specifically, QED challenges only the trial court's findings that: (1) QED, at its option, 
"allowed" Atlas to retain the balance of the joint check proceeds, which implies that QED 
had the choice to do so; and (2) that QED believed that Atlas did not yet "owe" the 
remaining portion of the November 13, 2001, joint check to QED. Thus, QED was only 
required to marshal evidence supporting the trial court's conclusions that QED possessed 
other options but "allowed" Atlas to retain the balance of the joint check, and that QED 
believed that Atlas did not yet owe it the remainder of the November 13, 2001, joint 
check. 
To satisfy Rule 24(a)(9)'s marshaling requirement, QED noted the subsidiary 
findings upon which the trial court based the above-referenced findings. (R. 2132 [^ 41— 
62.) QED then listed, in detail and complete with citations to the record, all of the 
evidence presented by either QED or USF&G at trial that supported the trial court's 
findings. (See Br. of Appellee & Cross-Appellant at 30-31.) QED then demonstrated 
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that this evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's findings. QED therefore 
scrupulously complied with Rule 24(a)(9)'s marshaling requirement. See Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(9); Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^ 76. 
Completely ignoring the narrowness of QED's two factual findings, USF&G 
faults QED's marshaling on the ground that it omits a number of purportedly important 
bits of evidence presented at trial. Given the narrowness of those two challenges, QED 
simply was not required to marshal the vast spectrum of evidence USF&G proposes, 
namely, evidence surrounding another, unrelated joint check; USF&G's efforts to 
ascertain its account balance by communicating with QED; invoices outstanding on the 
date of the November 13, 2001, joint check; and Atlas's payment practices. None of that 
evidence has anything to do with QED's narrow challenges to the trial court's findings 
regarding its intent in permitting Atlas to retain the balance of the joint check or whether 
QED believed that Atlas "owed" QED anything.3 Thus, QED was not required to 
marshal that evidence. 
Of course, all evidence presented at a trial is interconnected in some way or 
another. But that does not mean that an appellee may defeat an appellant's challenge to a 
finding of fact simply by pointing to any shred of evidence presented at trial and arguing 
that the appellant failed to marshal it. If that were so, the findings of fact in a case of any 
degree of complexity—like this one—would be virtually unassailable, regardless of how 
3
 Of course, the upshot of QED's challenges to the trial court's factual findings is that 
QED was not legally entitled to proceeds of the November 13, 2001, joint check that 
were not yet due. Moreover, QED believed that it could not retain the remaining 
$34,259.43 portion of the November 13, 2001, joint check because the remaining unpaid 
invoices on Altas's account for the Project were not yet due, not that Atlas did not owe 
QED that amount. QED has never maintained that Atlas was not obligated to eventually 
pay the invoices that were outstanding but not yet due as of November 13, 2001. 
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unsupported they are. An appellant could only satisfy the marshaling requirement by 
marshaling all evidence presented at trial. Such a rule would fly in the face of 
fundamental appellate rules such as page limits. See Utah R. App. P. 24(f) (imposing 
page limits on briefs); id 24(h) (noting that motions for leave to file an overlength brief 
are "disfavored"). That is not the kind of marshaling the Utah courts require. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently recognized that the marshaling rule is not as 
hypertechnical as USF&G characterizes it. In Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Court recognized that the marshaling requirement 
is but a "tool pursuant to which the appellate courts impose on the parties an obligation to 
assist them in conducting a whole record review." 2007 UT 42, ^ 19, 578 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 20. The Court took pains to emphasize that even if an appellant fails entirely to 
marshal, the appellate court "retains discretion to consider independently the whole 
record and determine if the decision below has adequate factual support." Id. If 20. 
Although QED fully complied with the marshaling requirement, the Supreme Court's 
message is clear: the marshaling requirement is not intended to be a mechanism for 
disposing of legitimate challenges to factual findings through overreaching extensions of 
technicalities like those advanced by USF&G. 
In sum, QED complied with the requirements of Rule 24(a)(9) and marshaled all 
the requisite evidence in support of the narrow factual findings it challenges. 
2. The Findings of Fact Upon Which the Trial Court Relied Are 
Clearly Erroneous. 
The trial court committed clear error finding that QED "allowed" Atlas to retain 
$34,259.43 of the $85,383.19 joint check in the "belief9 that Atlas did not "owe" that 
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amount to QED at the time the $85,383.19 joint check was negotiated. Evidence 
presented at trial does not support the trial court's finding that Atlas was due or past due 
on its account terms with QED for materials furnished to the Project in an amount greater 
than the $51,123.76 at the time the $85,383.19 joint check was issued, and that QED 
intended to waive payment for the remaining $34,259.43 that it allowed Atlas to retain. 
First, with respect to the trial court's finding that QED did not believe that Atlas 
owed QED the $34,259.43, the evidence establishes only that QED had invoiced Atlas 
for product supplied by QED for the Project and that Atlas was obligated to pay those 
invoices in accordance with the terms of its contract with QED. (R. 2220:219-20.) 
Furthermore, trial testimony demonstrates that the term "net-30," as used on the Unpaid 
Invoices, was clearly understood by Atlas and QED to provide up to sixty days after the 
issuance of the invoice for Atlas to make its payments. (R. 2221:446-47; 2222:557.) 
Thus, when QED invoiced Atlas, that invoice was not past due, and payment was not 
required for up to 60 days, depending on when the invoice was issued. Furthermore, each 
unpaid invoice contained a payment reminder at the bottom left corner that confirmed the 
actual due date of the invoice. (R. 2220:212, 217; 2221:446-47.) There is simply no 
evidence whatsoever that QED had any right to demand payment for amounts owed, but 
not yet due, under the terms of Atlas's account. The trial court's apparent reliance on 
evidence that the entirety of the November 13, 2001, joint check was due or past due, 
where there is no such evidence, is against "clear weight of the evidence" and therefore 
"clearly erroneous." See Department of Human Servs. ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 
676, 678 (Utah 1997). 
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Second, with respect to the trial court's finding that QED chose to allow Atlas to 
keep the $34,259.43, as if QED had a choice, the only evidence presented at trial by 
either party demonstrates that QED was obligated to allow Atlas to retain the portion of 
the $85,383.19 joint check if Atlas demanded such. (R. 2221:446-47; 2222:557, 595.) 
As set forth above, QED could not legally force Atlas to allow QED to retain the 
$34,259.43 portion of the joint check. Given that Atlas's remaining unpaid invoices were 
not yet due or past due, QED had no legal right to demand the full amount of the joint 
check proceeds. The trial court's finding to the contrary is against the "clear weight of 
the evidence" and "clearly erroneous." Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 678. Because the trial 
court's equitable estoppel ruling hinges on two clearly erroneous findings of fact, it must 
be reversed. Cf Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, f 55, 150 P.3d 480 (noting, in the 
context of Rule 60(b) motions that "[i]f a district court's ruling . . . is based on clearly 
erroneous factual findings . . . the district court has likely abused its discretion"). 
3. Equitable Estoppel Is Inappropriate in this Case Because USF&G 
Failed to Meet Its Evidentiary Burden for Proving Equitable 
Estoppel. 
Quite apart from its reliance on clearly erroneous findings of fact, the trial court 
abused its discretion because USF&G failed to meet its burden to present evidence at trial 
sufficient to establish estoppel. Cf Bolitho v. East 143 P. 584, 588 (Utah 1914) 
(reversing a trial court's equitable estoppel ruling in part because "the evidence was not 
competent to establish an estoppel"). Specifically, equitable estoppel should not have 
been applied in this case because USF&G presented no evidence that: (a) QED did not 
act in a manner inconsistent with its payment bond claim; (b) QED's endorsement of the 
$85,383.19 joint check was enough to constitute waiver of QED's bond claim; (c) 
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Comtrol's reliance on QED's endorsement of the $85,383.19 joint check was reasonable; 
(d) Comtrol properly ascertained the amount QED was due when it issued the $85,383.19 
joint check; and (e) QED's course of dealing with Atlas uniquely defined "net-30." 
a) QED has not acted in a manner inconsistent with its payment 
bond claim. 
USF&G failed to present any evidence at trial demonstrating that QED has been 
inconsistent in asserting its payment bond claim. It presented no evidence demonstrating 
that QED agreed to bear the risk of non-payment and waive its bond claim by allowing 
Atlas to retain $34,259.43 of the November 13, 2001 joint check proceeds. Moreover, it 
presented no evidence demonstrating that QED intended to waive its right to payment of 
the invoices—which could have been covered by the $34,259.43—by not demanding 
payment for those invoices until they were actually due. QED, on the other hand, 
presented evidence at trial demonstrating that it adhered to all the statutory requirements 
in asserting its bond claim. (R. 2220:17; PA-1.) 
b) The simple act of endorsing the $85,383.19 joint check is 
insufficient to bar QED's payment bond claim. 
Even if QED represented to USF&G that the $85,383.19 joint check was equal to 
an amount owed by Atlas, USF&G presented no evidence establishing that QED intended 
its endorsement of that check to be a waiver of its right against the payment bond posted 
for the Project (the "Bond") in the event of non-payment by Atlas. See 28 Am. Jur. 2d 
Estoppel & Waiver § 46 (2006) (requiring intent before applying equitable estoppel as a 
defense to a claim). In fact, QED did not knowingly or otherwise waive its right to 
payment from the Bond of the invoices that would have been paid in part or in full by the 
portion of the $85,383.19 joint check QED allowed Atlas to keep. 
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In Brimwood Homes, Inc. v. Knudsen Builders Supply Co., 385 P.2d 982 (Utah 
1963), the Utah Supreme Court held that where a construction materials supplier received 
payments for "more than it was legally entitled to at that time," a promise to waive its 
rights to future claims or liens "would be without consideration." Id. at 984. Therefore, 
even an attempt by QED to waive its rights against the Bond for the full amount of the 
$85,383.19 would be without consideration and unenforceable. USF&G presented no 
evidence that QED represented that it would waive any claim against the Bond if Atlas 
failed to pay for the materials QED supplied to the Project. See CECO Corp. v. Concrete 
Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 970 (Utah 1989) (concluding that estoppel was 
inappropriate because the supplier never expressly waived its rights against the Bond). 
Nor did it present any evidence demonstrating that QED intended to waive its bond claim 
by the simple act of endorsing a joint check. See Clark-Fontana Paint Co. v. Glassman 
Constr. Co., 397 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1968) (rejecting argument that by signing joint checks 
with conspicuous waiver language that a supplier had waived its lien rights). 
Moreover, contrary to USF&G's argument, USF&G presented no evidence 
establishing that QED knew anything about the $94,116.55 joint check until Comtrol 
called and asked QED whether it had received that joint check. (R. 2220:223.) 
Similarly, it presented no evidence that even implies that QED knew that Comtrol was 
"greatly concerned" by Atlas's retention of the $94,116.55 joint check or that Comtrol 
made it clear to QED that it was going to issue the $85,383.19 joint check and that the 
entire check was intended for QED. 
Moreover, the record affirmatively establishes that Comtrol could have done more 
to ascertain the actual amounts due QED at the time it issued the $85,383.19 joint check. 
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(R. 2222:637-41.) The consequences of its failure to do so should not be borne by QED. 
QED simply responded to Comtrol's generalized, blanket inquiry into the outstanding 
balance owed by Atlas. USF&G offered no evidence that QED attempted to lead 
Comtrol astray or represented intent to look to Atlas directly for payment. 
The fact that QED retained only that portion of the $85,383.19 joint check that 
Atlas was contractually obligated to pay does not constitute waiver under the 
circumstances of this case. See Soter's, Inc., 857 P.2d at 942 (setting forth the "only . . . 
legal standard required to establish waiver under Utah law"). On the contrary, the only 
finding supported by the record is that QED did not waive its right to assert a claim 
against the Bond for the full value of the materials furnished to the Project. 
c) Comtrors reliance on QED's endorsement of the $85,383.19 
joint check was unreasonable. 
Although the lien waivers may have related to different payments for the Project, 
the trial court's conclusion that Comtrol's reliance on those lien waivers was 
unreasonable demonstrates the implausibility of relying on a simple act of endorsing a 
joint check as a waiver of a portion QED's bond claim. The record does not support the 
application of equitable estoppel because if USF&G's reliance on QED's lien waivers 
was unreasonable (R. 2135 ]f 58; R. 2225:16), USF&G certainly was not entitled to rely 
on a response by QED to Comtrol's general inquiry regarding Atlas's account balance. 
Moreover, in presenting its ruling, the trial court stated that in light of the "sophisticated 
operation and the [joint] checks" used in this case, USF&G's reliance on the joint checks 
was not reasonable. (R. 2225:15-16, attached to QED's opening brief as Addendum A.) 
Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to conclude that by virtue of 
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allowing Atlas to temporarily retain the $34,259.43—which was payable but not yet 
due—QED should be estopped from recovering that amount. 
d) Comtrol is responsible for its own negligence in failing to 
ascertain the amount actually owed to QED. 
The very purpose of payment bond statutes is to shift the risk of non-payment 
away from suppliers (like QED) to general contractors and their sureties (like USF&G). 
See Krupp Steel Prods., Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 831 F.2d 978 (11th Cir. 1987); see also 
Geneva Pipe Co. v. Maughan, 714 P.2d 648, 650-51 (Utah 1986) ("The risk of loss . . . is 
one of the hazards which a surety, for a fixed consideration assumes by its contract." 
(quoting Salt Lake City v. O'Connor, 249 P. 810, 814 (Utah 1926))). The trial court's 
erroneous findings of fact effectively shift that risk of non-payment back to QED, forcing 
QED to bear the loss resulting from Comtrol and USF&G's own failure to ascertain the 
amounts due QED. 
The record affirmatively establishes that Comtrol failed to accurately determine 
the amount actually due QED when Comtrol issued the $85,383.19 joint check. The 
record further affirmatively establishes that Comtrol could have ascertained the exact 
amount due QED, but did not. (R. 2222:637-41.) See Syro Steel Co. v. Hubbell 
Highway Signs, Inc., 424 S.E.2d 208, 210 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that one of the 
elements of equitable estoppel is that the asserting party lack knowledge "and the means 
to acquire knowledge as to the real facts in question" (emphasis added)). Accordingly, 
Comtrol and its surety, USF&G, are responsible for their failure to ascertain or 
understand the terms of Atlas's account with QED, and the trial court abused its 
discretion when it made QED "responsible for monitoring its purchaser, rather than 
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making [Comtrol] responsible for monitoring its subcontractor." See Krupp Steel Prods., 
831 F.2d at 983 n.3; see also Geneva Pipe, 714 P.2d at 651 (discussing the "ample 
facilities" sureties have for protecting themselves as opposed to a supplier's general 
inability to monitor relationships with customers). 
e) QED's course of dealing with Atlas uniquely defined "net-
30". 
The uncontroverted terms of Atlas's account with QED specifically defined 
Atlas's payment obligation to require Atlas to pay invoices on the last day of the month 
following the month during which QED's invoice was issued. (R. 2132 J^ 41; PA-4.) The 
payment terms between QED and Atlas involved numerous occasions for performance by 
both. (Id.) Both Atlas and QED had knowledge of the nature of the performance, the 
opportunity to object to the arrangement, and an implicit understanding that the 
construction of the agreement and course of performance were reasonable. (R. 2132 f^ 
42.) All these factors are relevant to the meaning of the agreement between Atlas and 
QED and undisputedly point to the conclusion that the agreement required that payment 
be made on the last date of the month following the month in which the materials were 
furnished. (R. 2220:132-133; 2221:267-282.) The evidence submitted at trial regarding 
this critical term is compelling and virtually uncontested. 
4. Utah's Payment Bond Statute Provides Special Protection to QED. 
In its reply brief, USF&G concedes that payment bond statutes are to be liberally 
construed, but it argues that this liberal construction is "not without limits." (See Reply 
Br. of Appellants & Br. of Cross-Appellees at 24.) However, USF&G does not say what 
those limitations are, nor could it: the only "limitation" on the liberal construction 
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afforded to payment bond statutes is the language of those statutes. See J.W. Bateson Co. 
v. United States, 434 U.S. 586, 594 (1978) (noting that the rule of liberal construction 
"does not justify ignoring plain words of limitation" (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
United States ex rel. B. & R., Inc. v. Donald Lane Constr., 19 F. Supp. 2d 217, 223-24 
(D. Del. 1998) (noting consensus that notice provisions are an exception to the rule of 
liberal construction because "the remedial purposes of the Miller Act will not justify 
ignoring clear limitations imposed by the statute" (emphasis added)). That limitation 
does not provide Comtrol or USF&G the protection they seek. Utah's payment bond 
statute unambiguously allows QED to recover against the Bond "for any unpaid amount 
due" it. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504(4) (emphasis added). The liberal construction 
for which QED advocates is totally consistent with the language of the bond statute, and 
the "limitations" USF&G places upon that construction are illusory. 
No other reason exists to depart from the liberal construction normally afforded to 
payment bond statutes. Despite USF&G's contention, the trial court's estoppel decision 
will have little bearing on the veracity of communications between suppliers and general 
contractors. However, it will profoundly restrict the ability of suppliers to assert claims 
against payment bonds. Indeed, at the very least, the trial court's reduction of QED's 
claim significantly weakens the very purpose of the payment bond statute, namely, to 
ensure payment to those supplying labor and materials to public projects. See Am. Sur. 
Co. of N.Y. v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366, 368 (10th Cir. 1958) (noting that the purpose of the 
Miller Act is to "shift the ultimate risk of nonpayment from workmen and suppliers to the 
surety"); see also W. Coatings v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 788 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1990) 
(noting the many similarities between the Miller Act and Utah's payment bond statute). 
18 
At trial, USF&G offered no evidence that QED was anything but forthright in responding 
to Comtrol's inquiries regarding Atlas's account balance. More importantly, in spite of 
USF&G's efforts to represent otherwise, USF&G offered no evidence—and the trial 
court did not make any findings that would support such a contention—that QED 
attempted to lead Comtrol astray and then attempted to "benefit financially from [its] lack 
of candor." (See Reply Br. of Appellants & Br. of Cross-Appellees at 24.) 
5. Appellate Courts in Utah and Across the Country Have Rejected 
the Application of Equitable Estoppel as a Defense to Payment 
Bond Claims In Situations Similar to This Case. 
Finally, the cases cited by QED in its opening brief are just a representative 
sampling of the cases throughout the United States—and in particular, Utah—where 
appellate courts have rejected the application of equitable estoppel as a defense to 
payment bond claims in situations similar to this case. The status of the law of equitable 
estoppel in Utah was made clear in CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., where the 
Utah Supreme Court reversed a trial court's application of equitable estoppel as a defense 
to a payment bond claim. 772 P.2d at 970-71. Despite USF&G's argument to the 
contrary, CECO is not distinguishable. The fact that the supplier in CECO contacted the 
general contractor to advise it that the supplier had not been paid for work on a project is 
of no consequence and does not distinguish CECO. Instead, it actually highlights the 
inappropriateness of applying equitable estoppel in this case. If equitable estoppel was 
not an appropriate defense in CECO—where the sub-subcontractor made representations 
that it would continue to look to its customer for payment—it is certainly not appropriate 
here, where QED simply responded to Comtrol's general inquiry regarding the amount 
owed on Atlas's account and honored the terms of its agreement with Atlas. (R. 
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2220:213-14; 2222:589.) In CECO, the supplier represented to the general contractor 
that it would "continue to look to the subcontractor for payment," but no such 
representation was made in this case. 
Furthermore, QED never communicated an intention to waive its right to assert a 
claim against the Bond, and there is no evidence on the record that Comtrol gave 
"specific instructions to QED and Atlas that the full amount of the check was for QED." 
(Reply Br. of Appellants & Br. of Cross-Appellees at 25.) This reality is perhaps best 
illustrated by USF&G's recitation of "facts" that it believes surround the issuance of the 
$85,383.19 joint check. (See kL at 12-13.) USF&G goes to great lengths to recite all the 
"facts" surrounding the issuance of the $85,383.19 joint check, but it conspicuously omits 
any record citation to support its contention that Comtrol gave "specific instructions to 
QED and Atlas that the full amount of the check was for QED." (Id at 25.) 
Here, just as in CECO, the general contractor issued joint checks in an effort to 
ensure payment to the supplier. This Court should therefore follow the Utah Supreme 
Court's lead in CECO and adhere to the important public policy underlying the payment 
bond statute. To do otherwise would produce a "ludicrous result," namely, one that 
"make[s] it rather easy for general contractors to avoid their statutory obligation to 
provide assurances that their subcontractors will pay their bills." CECO, 772 P.2d at 970. 
That kind of unfairness should not be countenanced with an equitable estoppel ruling. 
Additionally, USF&G's theory, if adopted, provides an avenue for general contractors to 
shift the risk of non-payment from themselves to suppliers. Such a result is contrary to 
Utah's payment bond statute, waiver doctrine, and general principles of equity and 
20 
fairness. See Krupp Steel Prods., 831 F.2d at 983 n.3; see also Geneva Pipe, 714 P.2d at 
651. 
In this case, QED furnished materials to a public project for which it has not been 
paid. And, as in CECO, QED attempted to work with its customer (Atlas) to procure 
payment for its materials furnished to the Project. The only distinction between this case 
and CECO is that QED did not contact Comtrol, that QED always looked to Atlas for 
payment rather than to Comtrol, and that QED responded to Comtrol's general inquiry 
regarding the status of Atlas's account. When Atlas failed to pay QED in full, QED 
asserted a statutorily authorized claim against the Bond, which was posted to guarantee 
payment for all those furnishing labor and materials to the Project. Accordingly, the trial 
court abused its discretion by estopping QED from recovering the full amount of its 
payment bond claim. This Court should remand to the trial court with instructions that 
the trial court amend QED's judgment and award QED an additional $34,259.43, plus 
pre- and post-judgment interest. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND THE TRIAL COURT'S 
CALCULATION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO 
AWARD QED ALL OF ITS FEES. 
USF&G does not appear to dispute that if this Court concludes that the trial court 
abused its discretion by estopping QED from claiming the additional $34,259.43 that 
Atlas withheld from the November 13, 2001, joint check, the Court should remand the 
trial court's calculation of attorneys' fees with instructions to award QED all of its 
attorneys' fees. Indeed, it could not dispute that outcome. As noted in QED's initial 
brief, Utah courts employ a "flexible and reasoned approach" to determine which party in 
litigation is the prevailing party and therefore entitled to attorneys' fees. See Mountain 
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States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 649 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Employing that 
"flexible and reasoned approach," the trial court concluded that QED was the prevailing 
party, and USF&G does not dispute that conclusion. But the trial court must also employ 
some flexibility and reason when calculating the amount of attorneys' fees to which a 
prevailing party is entitled. Specifically, the court must consider certain "established 
touchstones" when calculating the amount of fees. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 
P.2d 985, 989-90 (Utah 1988). 
Here, the trial court initially awarded QED the full amount of its attorneys' fees, 
but it later reduced that award by 25%. (R. 1570-75, 2138 ^ 18.) The trial court based 
that reduction on its application of equitable estoppel principles to the November 13, 
2001 joint check, which is explained above. The court reasoned that because QED's 
recovered only a percentage of the recovery it sought (albeit a large percentage), the 
amount of attorneys' fees it may recover should be proportionally reduced. (See id.) As 
explained above, however, the trial court's application of equitable estoppel principles to 
the November 13, 2001 joint check was an abuse of discretion: QED should have been 
allowed to recover the full amount of the November 13, 2001 joint check from the Bond. 
Thus, if this Court reverses the trial court's equitable estoppel ruling and allows QED to 
recover the full amount of the November 13, 2001 joint check, this Court should employ 
a "flexible and reasoned approach" and award QED the remaining 25% of its attorneys' 
fees. Indeed, any other result would constitute legal error. See Dixie State Bank, 764 
P.2d at 991 (noting that once a trial court determines the amount of attorneys' fees to 
which a prevailing party is entitled, "it commits legal error if it awards less than the 
reasonable fee to which the successful litigant is entitled"). Indeed, this Court should 
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award QED all of its fees in any event: the trial court found that all of QED's attorneys' 
fees were reasonable (R. 2139 j^ 20), and it therefore abused its discretion in failing to 
award QED all of those reasonable fees. See id. This Court should remand the trial 
court's calculation of attorneys' fees and instruct it to award QED all of the fees and costs 
that the trial court previously determined were reasonable. 
HI. QED IS ENTITLED TO 18% INTEREST ON ITS ATTORNEYS5 FEES 
AND COSTS. 
Although USF&G acknowledges that this action is an action against the Bond, its 
position regarding the interest rate governing QED's award of fees and costs reflects its 
failure to fully appreciate the significance of the nature of this action. The payment bond 
statute provides that "[a] person shall have a right of action on a payment bond under this 
section for any unpaid amount due him." Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504(4) (emphasis 
added). Thus, the absence of a contract between USF&G and QED is of no consequence 
in determining the interest rate applicable to QED's fees and costs award. The contract 
between QED and Atlas defines the applicable rate, and USF&G's obligation under the 
payment bond statute requires it to compensate QED for whatever Atlas failed to pay 
pursuant to Atlas's contract with QED. Indeed, pursuant to the Bond, USF&G agreed to 
compensate QED for any sums that Atlas wrongfully failed to pay QED. (PA-1.) 
USF&G cannot now escape its obligation under the Bond by arguing that it never agreed 
to the terms of the agreement between QED and Atlas. 
Here, the contract between QED and Atlas allows QED, in litigation, to recover its 
costs of collection as well as its attorneys' fees. (PA-4.) It also provides for an 18% 
interest rate on all sums due and owing to QED. (Id.) Thus, if QED were to sue Atlas 
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and prevail, it would be allowed to recover 18% interest on the entire amount recovered, 
including fees and costs. Thus, USF&G must, pursuant to the bond statute and the Bond 
itself, compensate QED for "any unpaid amount due." See Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-
504(4). In other words, by virtue of its obligation as a surety, USF&G must pay 18% 
interest on QED's award of attorneys' fees and costs. 
It is true, as USF&G points out, that pursuant to section 15-1-4 "a judgment 
rendered on a lawful contract shall. . . bear the interest agreed upon by the parties." Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-l-4(2)(a) (emphasis added). It is also true that this is not an action on a 
contract, but against the Bond, and that section 15-l-4(2)(a) does not directly govern this 
issue. However, the tangential import of section 15-l-4(2)(a) does not mean that the 
interest rate applicable to QED's award of fees and costs cannot be defined by any 
contract. Section 15-l-4(2)(a) pertains only to judgments arising from contracts between 
parties to litigation; it has nothing to do with judgments against sureties arising from 
payment bonds. Seeking nevertheless to make some hay from 15-l-4(2)(a), USF&G 
argues that because section 15-l-4(2)(a) does not govern the interest rate applicable to 
QED's fees and costs award, the default rate applies. That argument ignores the other 
statutory provisions that govern the applicable interest rate, and it is tantamount to 
arguing that section 15-1-4 simultaneously governs and does not govern the interest rate 
applicable to QED's fees and costs award.4 
4
 QED's reference, in its opening brief, to section 15-l-4(2)(a) as the "relevant" statute 
was correct: it indeed governs the interest rate on judgments arising from actions on 
contracts, and had QED obtained a judgment against Atlas, QED's judgment would have 
borne an interest rate of 18%. The amount of any judgment that QED could have 
obtained against Atlas is precisely the amount that QED should recover against USF&G. 
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In any event, Utah Code section 15-l-4(3)(a), on which USF&G hangs its hat, 
does not govern this issue either. By its plain terms, that provision only applies "[e]xcept 
as otherwise provided by law." Utah Code Ann. § 15-l-4(3)(a). Here, law otherwise 
provides: the payment bond statute unambiguously allows QED to recover from USF&G 
"for any unpaid amount due." Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504(4). The amount due QED is 
the amount specified in its contract with Atlas: attorneys' fees and costs at an 18% 
interest rate. That is what USF&G, as the surety, owes QED. 
In fine, despite USF&G's recognition of the nature of this action, it ignores the 
significance of that nature. The trial court erred by applying a 6.37% interest rate to 
QED's award of fees and costs. This Court should remand to the trial court with 
instructions that the trial court apply the 18% post-judgment interest rate, which is 
consistent with QED's contract with Atlas, to the award of fees and costs. 
IV, QED SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ON 
APPEAL. 
QED requested an award of attorneys' fees and costs on appeal in its opening 
brief. (See Br. of Appellee & Cross-Appellant at 50.) USF&G does not appear to 
dispute this, nor could it. As the prevailing party to the action below, in addition to those 
attorneys' fees and costs already awarded, QED is also entitled to all attorneys' fees and 
costs incurred on appeal, assuming that it prevails on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-
56-38(6) (renumbered 63-56-504(6)) ("In any suit upon a payment bond, the court shall 
award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. . . ." (emphasis added)). 
USF&G has erroneously assumed that QED's statement that section 15-l-4(2)(a) was the 
"relevant" statute means that it governs this Court's resolution of this precise issue. 
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Accordingly, QED's judgment against USF&G should be augmented to include all 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm QED's Amended Judgment against USF&G in the 
amount of $307,412.74, but it should reverse the trial court's application of equitable 
estoppel. Specifically, this Court should conclude that: (1) the trial court abused its 
discretion by applying equitable estoppel principles to this case, (2) erred by reducing 
QED's attorneys' fees award, and (3) erred by not awarding QED 18% interest on the full 
amount of QED's Judgment against USF&G. Accordingly, the Court should award QED 
an additional $34,259.43, along with all its attorneys' fees in prosecuting this matter, 
including attorneys' fees and costs incurred on appeal, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-
56-504(6), and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the rate of 18% per annum. 
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